We study the e¤ect of interbank market integration on small …rm …nance in the build-up to the 2007-2008 …nancial crisis. We use a comprehensive data set that contains contract terms on individual loans to 6,000+ …rms across 14 European countries between 1998:01 and 2005:12. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and approval process. Our …ndings imply that integration of interbank markets resulted in less stringent borrowing constraints and in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease was strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors. We also …nd that in the most rapidly integrating markets, …rms became substantially overleveraged during the build-up to the crisis.
Introduction
Financial integration is widely perceived to stimulate investment-based growth through a reduction in the cost of equity, bond, and bank …nancing. 1 Little is known, however, about the e¤ect integration of interbank markets has on small …rm …nance. How does the degree and speed of interbank market integration a¤ect the availability and cost of bank loans? And does rapid integration simply lead to cheaper …rm …nancing, or also to excessive leverage? Given the freezing and subsequent partial disintegration of interbank markets after August 2007, and in order to make informed inferences about the e¤ect of interbank market disfunctionality on the real economy, it is important to investigate how pre-crisis integration had a¤ected …nancing of small and medium enterprises. By studying the mechanisms through which the integration of the interbank market works, our paper contributes to a growing literature on the bene…ts and costs of …nancial globalization. 2 Theory suggests that interbank market integration increases the availability and reduces the cost of bank loans granted to …rms through three di¤erent channels. Interbank market integration: 1) increases the competition to supply bank loans; 2) reduces the cost of external funding for banks; and 3) allows for greater diversi…cation of risk. 3 As the interbank market provides banks with ready access to short-and long-term loans to …nance their own investment operations and cushion liquidity shocks, interbank market integration allows banks to o¤er more and/or cheaper …nancing. The secured interbank market further allows for diversi…cation without the risk of crossregional …nancial contagion (Fecht, Grüner, and Hartmann (2007) ). Interbank market integration can therefore increase the bene…ts of integrating the retail banking markets that occurs through cross-border lending and/or bank mergers. The more favorable conditions at which banks will 1 The euro area has been a prime example of swift integration following the introduction of the common currency, with various estimates of the resulting increase in GDP ranging between 0:3% and 2%. See "Quanti…cation of the Macro-Economic Impact of EU …nancial integration" by London Economics. 2 The real e¤ects of …nancial integration that are investigated include its e¤ect on economic growth (Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Slok (2002)), entrepreneurial activity (Giannetti and Ongena (2009) , Alfaro and Charlton (2007) ), crosscountry correlations in GDP growth (Imbs (2004) ), and consumer welfare (Fecht, Grüner and Hartmann (2007) ), among others. For a recent study on the determinants of international …nancial integration, see Lane and MilessiFerretti (2008) . 3 Regarding the latter, interbank market integration may have an impact that is independent of cross-border bank ownership. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) for example …nd that the deregulation of the US banking sector a¤ected the income insurance of small business owners without any signi…cant multistate cross-ownership of banks.
borrow and share risks in principle should result in better loan terms for all …rms, and more …nancing with bank loans. 4 However, there are two potential downsides to this process. First, if integration is accompanied by foreign bank entry, small …rms may be rationed as foreign banks concentrate their lending on large …rms that are involved in the production of tradeables (Agenor (2001) ). Second, while integration is expected to improve …nancing conditions and increase leverage for the …rms that have access to bank credit (Giannetti and Ongena (2009) ), rapid integration might also result in excessive leveraging and/or dependence on bank loans. Such a process can have a palpable negative e¤ect on …rms if it is followed by a credit crunch of the type that was experienced globally after August 2007. 5 One nuance is in order. Prior research has suggested that the bene…ts of bank integration on small business …nance are a¤ected by credit market competition, although it is unclear whether they are enhanced or diminished by it. Competition lowers the surplus banks can extract from their borrowers and speeds up interest rate adjustments (Klein (1971) ; Monti (1972) ; Herrmann and Jochen (2003) ). In concentrated (and uncontested) markets the few operating banks may be slow to pass the decline in market interest rates to their clients. If competition is …erce, banks are forced to react quickly not to lose market share. Integration in the interbank markets may therefore make bank loan terms react more quickly and substantially to its changes. However, competition and therefore integration may not bene…t all …rms at all times. Petersen and Rajan (1995) for example argue that when credit markets are concentrated banks are more likely to …nance the opaque, i.e., small or young, …rms because internalizing the bene…ts of assisting them is possible.
International …nancial liberalization may therefore lead to a deterioration in the credit conditions for small …rms.
Our paper contributes to the literature by estimating the e¤ect of interbank market integration on small …rm …nance while taking into account the structure of credit markets. We focus on a sample 4 Integration in interbank markets need not naturally arise, however. Freixas and Holthausen (2005) for example show that -when banks need to cope with liquidity shocks by borrowing or by liquidating assets -an equilibrium with market integration does not always exist; in their model integration may even coexist with segmentation. 5 For the new EU member states, the sample period coincides with their rapid transition from "parochial" credit markets with mostly state-owned …nancial institutions to integrated credit markets populated by foreign-owned …nancial institutions with ready access to integrated euro-zone interbank markets. And as interbank market integration in the euro area countries was almost complete at the beginning of the period, our data provides us with a control and a treatment group to estimate the e¤ect of integration on small …rm …nance. We construct measures of both the degree and speed at which yields in all national interbank markets converge relative to yields in Germany, the country we take as our benchmark market, and relate convergence bank loan rates and on …rm leveraging.
Our second contribution is methodological. Business loans are only observed when …rms apply for credit and banks grant it. Most studies analyzing the e¤ect of market conditions on bank loan terms ignore this sequential selection process. 6 In contrast we account for the loan application and granting decision by estimating a double selection model. Our dataset contains detailed information on …rms that did not apply for bank loans and information on …rms that applied but were denied bank loans. Heckman (1979) shows that such observed information can be used to eliminate the bias induced by the left-truncation of the sample. Hence, while we are mostly interested in the loan terms for the group of …rms that seek and obtain bank loans, we are able to eliminate the speci…cation error resulting from the double sample selection by incorporating information from the other groups of …rms in our estimation. Thus we are able to purge the bias stemming from the e¤ect of integration on bank credit desirability and credit constraints.
We …nd that interbank market integration alleviates credit constraints and decreases the loan rates charged to …rms both in a statistically signi…cant and economically relevant way. Accounting for …rm selection, a deepening of integration by two standard deviations given our measure of interbank market integration would result in a decrease in loan rates by 134 basis points after selection is accounted for. And if a euro zone country in the sample would return to its degree of interbank market integration in the last year prior to joining the euro, loan rates would, ceteris paribus, be almost 60 basis points higher. However, these results only hold in countries with a considerable degree of credit market competition. Finally, lower loan rates may lead to excessive …rm leverage. If for example integration increases by two standard deviations, the probability that a …rm is overleveraged vis-à-vis the leverage of a similar benchmark …rm increases between 10% and 14%. Our evidence thus points to one speci…c channel through which the European integration of the past decade contributed to both the growth and the vulnerability of the region's non-…nancial …rms.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the construction of our measure of interbank market integration. Section 4 summarizes the country-level (measures of interbank market rates and credit market competition) and …rm-level data (individual bank loans and …rm characteristics). Section 5 presents the empirical evidence, and Section 6 concludes.
Empirical strategy
The demand for any asset can be derived in a general portfolio choice model in which …rms maximize their expected pro…ts subject to a lifetime budget constraint. The supply of an asset can be derived from pro…t maximization by banks -subject to the constraint that the sum of assets and liabilities does not exceed net worth -accounting for the degree of competition. Dicks-Mireaux and King (1982) and Cox and Jappelli (1993) for example estimate the demand for credit. The equilibrium …rm debt is modelled conditional on the …rm holding a positive amount of debt and being unconstrained in the credit market. The supply of funds is not explicitly modeled in these papers. We model the terms on the bank loans we observe conditional on …rms holding some debt and being unconstrained. We control for …rm characteristics and account for the borrowing and lending conditions that banks face in interbank markets as well as for the structure of the banking sector.
We employ a three-equation generalized Tobit model. We assume that loan rates, Y ijt , on a loan to …rm i in country j at time t, which are observable to us, are a linear function of …rm i variables X i and country j variables Z j at time t:
" 1ijt is a random component which varies at the …rm, country and time level that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 1 . Y it is observed only if the demand for debt is positive and the …rm is not credit constrained.
Let the dummy variable Q equals 1 if the …rm desires positive bank credit and equals 0 otherwise.
The value of Q is in turn determined by the latent variable:
where X 2it contains the values of X 1it and other supplementary variables that may e¤ect the …rm's …xed costs and convenience associated with using bank credit. The variable Q = 1 if q > 0 and Q = 0 otherwise. The error " 2it is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 2 .
Bank loan rates are only observable when …rms actually receive loans. Implicitly the model assumes that a loan is received if the …rm needs a loan, applies for it, and the application is not rejected by the bank (i.e., the …rm is not credit constrained). Equation (2) addresses the …rst part of this condition but not the second. Some …rms may need to have a strictly positive amount of bank debt but are constrained in their access to bank …nancing. We assume that such credit constraints take the form of a binary constraint which is …rm-speci…c. BEEPS makes it possible to directly estimate that constraint as the survey asks …rms about their reasons for not applying and their experience in general with bank loans. Constraints on obtaining credit may be a function of …rm and bank characteristics. As we do not observe the bank that is actually granting the loan, we employ the characteristics of the country's banking sector as a proxy.
We de…ne a …rm to be credit constrained if it needs credit but did not receive any bank loan.
If the …rm obtains a bank loan, it is unconstrained. Unlike studies on consumer debt which are interested in the di¤erence between desired and actual debt (Hayashi (1982) ; Cox and Jappelli (1993)), we are mainly interested in the loan rate, accounting for other loan terms such as maturity and collateral. Hence, we de…ne a dummy variable C which equals 1 if the …rm is unconstrained and equals 0 otherwise. The latent variable for C depends on the determinants of desired credit:
X 3ijt is a vector of …rm-level variables that may determine the demand for debt and proxies for the time-variant relevant characteristics of the banking sector. C = 1 if c > 0, and C = 0 otherwise. The error " 3ijt is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 3 .
In terms of timing of the game, we assume that the …rm …rst applies for a loan, if it desires positive bank debt, and it receives one if it is unconstrained. This procedure allows us to distinguish between four di¤erent regimes speci…ed by the latent variables q and c: (1) …rms that do not need bank credit and are constrained (Q = 0; C = 0), (2) …rms that do not need bank credit and are unconstrained (Q = 0; C = 1), (3) …rms that need bank credit but are constrained (Q = 1; C = 0), and (4) unconstrained …rms with (positive) bank credit (Q = 1; C = 1). The estimation strategy follows Heckman (1979) . We use the observed information for all …rms in order to eliminate the bias induced by the left-truncation of our sample to …rms that need and obtain bank credit. Hence, while it is the latter group that we are interested in, we incorporate information from the …rst three groups to eliminate the speci…cation error induced by this sample selection bias. 7 As to the exact estimation sequence, we …rst estimate the credit-desirability equation on the full sample, then the absence-of-borrowing-constraint equation on the sub-sample of …rms that desire strictly positive debt, and …nally the loan-rate equation on the sub-sample of …rms with strictly positive debt, incorporating the information from the two selection equations.
The expectation of the cost of bank credit for the fourth group of …rms is:
Using the distribution of the error terms de…ned above and the standard probit normalization
, one can obtain consistent estimates of and up to a factor of proportionality. Let 12 and 13 indicate the simple correlation between " 1 and " 2 and between " 1 and " 3 , respectively.
Hence, the …nal estimation procedure employed can be written as:
(q) (q) and (c) (c) are the inverse Mill's ratios (Heckman (1979) ). The probability of being in the sample of observed loans is (q) (c).
Next, we specify the model in terms of our variables of interest. The credit-desirability equation contains …rm variables which contain information about how likely it is that the …rm will need bank credit: measures of integration in the banking sector, ownership structure (individual/family, private/government or domestic/foreign ownership), ownership history (privatized or originally private if not government owned), whether the …rm exports, whether the …rm receives subsidies from any branch of government, and whether it is subject to strong competition in product markets.
We also use a proxy for …rm size where the …rm is de…ned as small if it has less than 50 employees, medium if it has between 50 and 250 employees, and large if it has more than 250 employees.
Finally, year and country dummies are included to account for the possibility that desired bank credit is a function of (time-varying) macroeconomic and (constant) country characteristics.
The reduced form model for being unconstrained contains the same set of variables, but it also includes: (1) a proxy for whether the …rm uses external auditing by a certi…ed agency, and (2) the degree of banking sector concentration as a measure of bank competition.
3 Measuring interbank market integration Scitovski (1969) was the …rst to formulate a comprehensive de…nition of …nancial market integration by pointing out that "the perfect integration of asset markets means (...) that the asset must be transferable and the portfolio preferences of individual asset holders are regionally unbiased" (op.
cit., p. 89). Building upon that formulation, …nancial integration in general and interbank market integration in particular can be de…ned using two broad criteria: the volume of transactions and the e¢ ciency of the markets (Obstfeld (1986) ). 8 In this paper, we choose as a proxy for interbank market integration a measure à la Engle and Granger (1979), namely, the measures of the co-integration between the rates in the domestic interbank markets and the rates in Germany, which we take as our benchmark market. Given that we want to compute the degree of integration in di¤erent subperiods over a longer time period, the simplest possible model that can be estimated is:
r j t represent the nominal yield to maturity observed on a daily basis at time t for country j and r b t represents the yield to maturity at time t for the benchmark German asset. In integrated markets, common shocks will be diversi…ed away, prices are mainly driven by common factors, and hence the co-integration parameter will be positive, and equal to 1. Working with nominal rather than real rates should be of no concern as with increasing coordination of monetary policy and real macroeconomic convergence, …nancial integration implies convergence in both nominal and real yields. In addition, working with nominal yields allows us to be consistent with the analysis 8 Measuring the volumes of transactions has an innate appeal. But a smaller number of international …nancial transactions does not automatically imply market segmentation, if integration makes domestic and foreign investments equivalent for investors. On the other hand, capital ‡ight in response to monetary and/or …nancial distress is hardly a sign of deepening integration (Herrmann and Jochem (2003) ). Measures of …nancial integration based on the law of one price are therefor preferred.
The problem with this simple approach is that the resulting time series of j t 's for each country i will have serially correlated standard errors, resulting in in ‡ated t-statistics. This is problematic given that the j t 's will be used as explanatory variables in the second stage where we study the e¤ect of interbank sector integration on loan rates. For this reason, we employ a di¤erent speci…cation, namely:
In this case the estimates are computed over the full time series for each country instead of within the rolling windows. This speci…cation allows for a time-varying Formally, we estimate the model in Equation (7) as well as the model:
t is the di¤erence in adjacent daily yields for country j and r b t is the di¤erence in adjacent daily yields for the benchmark country Germany. Thus, Equation (7) re ‡ects the long-run equilibrium adjustment, while Equation (8) represents the short-term adjustment of local interbank market rates to their long-run equilibrium. In all estimations, we include the market rates for the di¤erent countries separately in order to observe country-speci…c e¤ects. The short-run model includes the error-correction term j u jt 1 . The …nal estimates of interest of the degree of interbank market integration for each country j are
4 Data
Interbank market integration indicators
To compute our main proxy for interbank market integration we employ interbank nominal yields on 1-, 3-and 6-month money market instruments from the Global Financial database for the period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2005. We focus on the 6-month yields, but use 1-and 3-month series in robustness tests. The sample features a control group of euro-zone countries for which integration was achieved as early as the beginning of the period, and a treatment group of central and eastern European countries which started at low level of integration and integrated at di¤erent speed over the period. 
Firm-level data
We match the data on interbank market integration, constructed using underlying data on inter- for interviews accounted for 38:3% of the original target group. Firms that were ineligible due to the necessity to ful…ll industry quotas accounted for the remainder. As we are interested in the e¤ects of integration we study the countries that were EU members at the end of the interview period. The …nal dataset used includes 6; 047 …rms from 10 countries that became EU members after December 31, 1997 (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) and 4 countries that were EU members from the start (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). Respondent …rms come from 8 di¤erent sectors: Mining and quarrying;
Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation, storage and communication; Wholesale, retail, and repairs; Real estate, renting and business services; Hotels and restaurants; and Others. The number of …rms covered is roughly proportional to the number of …rms in the country, ranging from 217 in Lithuania to 975 in Poland. The survey also tried to achieve representativeness in terms of the size of …rms it surveyed: between two thirds and three quarters of the …rms surveyed are "small" (less than 50 workers) and around 10% of the …rms surveyed are "large" (more than 250 workers). 9 Table 1 provides the summary statistics on the number of …rms and their size distribution by country.
Although the dataset is almost purely cross-sectional (for each …rm answers are averaged over the period of the survey), there is a time dimension in the data on bank loans. Indeed, each …rm is asked about the cost, maturity, currency denomination, and the time it took to negotiate the last bank loan -if any -as well as about the exact month and year in which the loan was received.
Firms report to have received loans between January 1998 and December 2005. On the basis of this information we construct a synthetic panel covering 96 months. We then match this panel to our measures of …nancial integration. These measures are calculated as in Equations (7) and (8) from daily yields in the Global Financial database. The j t 's are then averaged for each month to
give 96-month series. 2; 609 of the non-German …rms in the dataset obtained a loan during this period. 10 Firms with outstanding bank credit provide many details on their most recent loan. Most important for our purposes, BEEPS includes information on the annualized cost of the loan. The survey further covers loan duration and collateralization (as a proportion of the loan amount).
We focus on the loan rate and calculate the "real" rate as the spread between the nominal rate of the loan and the nominal yield on a German 6-month money market instrument in the same year:month. Table 2 provides the sample summary statistics by country for the most relevant loan characteristics. We exclude all observations for which loans were received earlier than January 1998. In the remaining sample, the real average annualized rate of loans is 5:7%, ranging from 2:4% in Ireland to 15:7% in Romania. The overwhelming majority of loans in all countries are collateralized, but there is great deal of variation, with the share of collateralized loans ranging from 58% in Greece to 93% in Romania. Average loan duration ranges from 24 months in Spain to 69 months in Ireland. Within the sub-sample of central and east European countries, Lithuania has the lowest average spread at 337 basis points, and Estonia has the longest average maturity at 1 year.
Crucial for our selection correction, we can derive the …rm's need for a bank loan and the tightness of its …nancial constraint directly from the answers to several BEEPS questions. Question 1 0 Germany is excluded from the regression analysis as the benchmark country. asks "If your …rm did not apply for a loan, what were the main reasons?" We classify …rms as having no need for bank credit those choosing in 47b the answer "Does not need a loan" and …rms as credit constrained those marking in 47a the answer "Because the application was turned down" or in 47b
the answers "Application procedures for banks are too burdensome", "Collateral requirements for bank loans are too strict", "Interest rates are too high", "It is necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans", or "Did not think it would be approved". This strategy of grouping …rms that were turned down and …rms that were discouraged from applying is also employed in Cox and Jappelli (1993) and is standard in studies that rely on detailed questionnaires.
We further use country-level variables to account for the e¤ect of interbank market integration.
The propensity of banks to grant credit and the loan rate will depend on the o¢ cial money market rates. For this reason, we include the contemporaneous monthly nominal rate in all regressions. between foreign ownership and HHI ( = 0:32).
Empirical results
We estimate a simple model of the e¤ect of interbank market integration on business loan rates.
First, in a basic model, we do not account for credit market competition and estimate the following version of Equation (5):
where Y ijt is either the real loan rate, i.e., the spread over the nominal benchmark money market rate, on a loan granted to …rm i in country j at time t, or the …rm's capital structure (for example, the share of capital investment …nanced with bank loans). In the main model of interest, we also account for the degree of competition in the banking sector. BC j is either the C3 or HHI, de…ned earlier. Formally, the model becomes:
As in the previous model, the estimator of interest is 1 . In the empirical exercise, we proxy banking sector concentration with dummies which equal 1 (0) if the country during this time period is in the bottom (top) half of the distribution for bank concentration, or HHI. Again, we expect the sign of 1 to be positive for the composite term with the dummy for low banking sector concentration. Table 4 reports the within-country and panel unit root tests for benchmark and country-speci…c interbank market rates for 6-month instruments (the results are identical when we perform the exercise using the 1-and 3-month instruments). Table 4 also reports the Engle-Granger co-integration test as applied to the long-run models of the interbank rates. The unit root tests estimates and statistics (Columns (1)- (4)) indicate non-stationarity of the series at the 5% level for all but 3 countries in the dataset. For the panel the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected at the 5% level. We also apply the unit root test for the …rst-di¤erence of the rates to test for second-order non-stationarity. The results overwhelmingly reject I(2) and hence support the conclusion that the rate series are integrated of order 1. Given these …ndings, we proceed to test for co-integration between interbank market rates and the corresponding benchmark rates.
Unit roots and co-integration
Columns (5) and (6) report the estimates and statistics from the Engle-Granger co-integration test as applied to the long-run models of the interbank rates. For 8 of the 14 countries, as well as for the full panel series, the hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected at the 1% con…dence level. Apparently, for some countries the adjustment of the domestic rates is slow and not even a long-run relationship can be detected in the sample. However, the results for the majority of the countries (the euro zone countries plus the three Baltic states) as well as for the full series imply a strong long-run equilibrium relationship between domestic and benchmark rates. Hence we can proceed to construct and use our j t with a strong degree of con…dence. Table 5 presents the results from the …rst stage probit regression for bank loan desirability. The probability of needing bank credit is higher in more integrated markets and in markets where nominal interbank rates or lower. This result immediately justi…es our selection procedure: integration not only (potentially) a¤ects loan rates, but also the degree to which …rms need loans. Not accounting for this selection will introduce a bias into the main estimates. The need for bank credit also decreases in the size of the …rm and is lower for government-owned and foreign-owned …rms.
Selection estimation
The latter companies may face lower costs of internal funding either due to a soft budget constraint in the case of government ownership or to a higher supply of loans in the case of foreign ownership.
The need for bank loans is higher for exporters potentially due to their faster expansion. It is also higher for subsidized …rms, potentially implying that subsidies signal …nancial need more than they alleviate it, and for …rms which face high competition, potentially implying lower margins and fewer internal funds to …nance investment. Whether the ownership of the …rm changed hands from the state to the private sector doesn't matter for bank loan need. Table 6 presents the results of the probit equation for the absence of borrowing constraints.
Because the probit for the desirability of bank debt and the probit for unconstrained status may have correlated errors (due to the econometrician not observing in both cases the same …rm-level characteristics), we estimate a bivariate probit. In the second equation, we also account for characteristics of the business environment, notably the degree of competition in the banking sector. We again …nd that integration matters -this time, in more integrated markets …rms are more likely to be unconstrained. Not surprisingly, the probability of being unconstrained is lower for small-and medium-size …rms, as well as for companies which are government-owned (these …rms may be considered less trustworthy counterparts in the post-communist era). 
Main results
In Table 7 , we report the estimates for Equation (9) that assesses the e¤ect of interbank market integration on real loan rates (the spread between the nominal rate of the loan and the nominal yield on a German 6-month money market instrument in the same year:month). We use the estimate of the degree of convergence of 6-month, 3-month, and 1-month nominal yields as a proxy for interbank market integration, and do not yet account for the structure of the banking sector. After an initial analysis in Column (1), we drop 168 Romanian …rms due to the anomalous nature of the Romanian interbank market highlighted before. 12 Column (2) reports the main estimates on the full sample excluding Romania. Small …rms face higher loan rates, as expected, while audited …rms and exporters pay lower rates. Longer maturity loans carry lower loan rates. Importantly for us, the estimate of 1 is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level: …rms operating in countries where interbank markets are more integrated obtain lower loan rates. Numerically, a two standard deviation increase in interbank market integration would lead to a decrease in real rates by about 123 basis points. The result even holds when we limit the sample to the euro zone countries only. The estimated coe¢ cients then imply that if all euro zone countries were to go back to the degree of interbank market integration in their last year prior to joining the euro zone, 13 loan rates would be ceteris paribus higher by 50 basis points on average.
Next, in Column (3) we account for the left-truncation of the sample by including the selection terms estimated in the two probit equations. Importantly, the sign pattern of the selection terms (when signi…cant) con…rms our intuition and justi…es the application of a procedure correcting for the selection biases. The coe¢ cient on the …rst selection term in Column (3) implies a negative correlation between unobservables in the equation for bank credit desirability and those in the business loan rate equation. This negative correlation implies that unobserved factors that decrease the real cost of a business loan tend to increase the probability of the need for a bank loan.
Conversely, the coe¢ cient on the second selection term is positive, implying that unobserved factors that decrease the real cost of a business loan tend to decrease the probability that the …rm will not be credit constrained. After accounting for selection, we estimate that a two standard deviation increase in interbank market integration would lead to a decrease in real rates by about 134 basis points. Excluding the selection terms from the equation thus results in an underestimation of the true e¤ect by around 9%. The economic and statistical signi…cance of our estimates remains little changed when estimate the same equation using estimates for interbank market integration based on yields on 3-month instruments (Column (4)) and on 1-month instruments (Column (5)). Finally, the magnitude of the estimates increases substantially when we replace the country and year dummies with country-speci…c time trends in Column (6), implying that to some degree our measure of integration might be proxying for a common regional trend.
Identi…cation, foreign ownership, errors-in-variables, and misreporting
We now address four main issues with the data and our methodology. First, there is a potential endogeneity issue with our estimation strategy so far. Namely, if loan rates drop because of the opening of the domestic banking market, banks may seek cheaper …nancing on the interbank market spurring the integration of rates. In essence, this implies that our integration and loan rate measures could be determined simultaneously, resulting in a bias in the estimation. To address this problem which confounds identi…cation, we proceed to implement the idea initially put forth by Rajan and Zingales (1998) that …nance plays a more important role for …rms in industries that for technological reasons are more dependent on external …nancing. Some of the key characteristics that make an industry more or less dependent on external …nancing are variations in the scale of projects, gestation period, the ratio of hard vs. soft information that is being used by loan o¢ cers to assess the business, the ratio of tangible vs. intangible assets, follow-up investments, etc. Consequently, a manufacturing …rm for example may be more dependent on external …nancing than a hotel or a restaurant. The basic idea then is to rank industries by their "natural" dependence on bank …nancing, and use the industries which have low sensitivity to bank …nancing as a control group in a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences empirical model. Identi…cation is achieved by measuring the di¤erential e¤ect of interbank market integration between industries that are dependent on bank …nancing and those that are not.
Therefore, we proceed to calculate benchmark industry-speci…c proxies for dependence on external …nance based on information on German …rms, which are also present in the BEEPS, but are excluded from the sample because we use the German interbank rate as our benchmark. We …rst calculate the mean share of capital investment …nanced with bank loans for large German …rms (with more than 500 employees) in each industry. The rationale is that large …rms are relatively unconstrained, and so their use of bank loans represents a good benchmark for the natural demand of the industry, free of credit supply considerations. We construct both a level and an indicator benchmark. 14 We also construct capital usage benchmarks utilizing information on the ratio of material input costs to total sales by German …rms. 15 Then we interact these benchmark values with our measure of integration in equation (9) . The results, reported in Columns (1)- (4) of Table   8 con…rm the validity of the procedure: namely, we …nd that only in industries that are dependent on external …nance does interbank market integration a¤ect loan rates in the direction recorded before. These results give us con…dence that the e¤ects we observe are not due to omitted variable bias or reverse causality.
Second, we account for the fact that our measure of interbank market integration may be contaminated by banking sector integration in the sense of increasing foreign ownership. For instance, interbank market yields may be decreasing alongside banks being able to borrow in internal capital access from their parent banks. Thus, our measure may be capturing the e¤ect of the acquisition of central and eastern European banks by euro zone-based banks rather than increased interbank activity between the two types of banks, resulting in omitted variables bias. To address this issue,
in Column (5) we include alongside our measure of money markets integration a measure of the share of banking sector assets held by banks with at least 50% foreign ownership. 16 We assume that foreign bank presence is a good proxy for cross-country banking sector integration, and especially as it gives the individual bank access to a larger internal market. The gist of our previous …nding remains unchanged: all else equal, …rms are charged lower loan rates in countries with a higher share of the banking sector in foreign hands. This con…rms the …ndings in Demyanyk, 1 4 The respective mean shares of capital investment …nanced with bank loans are, as follows: 0.07 (Mining and quarrying); 0.16 (Construction); 0.20 (Manufacturing); 0.19 (Transportation, storage and communication); 0.15 (Wholesale, retail, repairs); 0.12 (Real estate, renting, and business services); 0.08 (Hotels and restaurants); and 0.10 (Other). We construct the level benchmark by assigning the respective industry value to all …rms in that industry. We also construct an indicator benchmark, where we give a value of 1 to all …rms in industries Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, storage and communication, and Wholesale, retail, repairs, and 0 to all other …rms. This decision is unchanged when we calculate means by taking all …rms into account. 1 5 The respective mean industry ratios of total material costs to total sales are, as follows: 0.90 (Mining and quarrying); 0.86 (Construction); 0.87 (Manufacturing); 0.80 (Transportation, storage and communication); 0.88 (Wholesale, retail, repairs); 0.64 (Real estate, renting, and business services); 0.78 (Hotels and restaurants); and 0.66 (Other). We construct the level benchmark by assigning the respective industry value to all …rms in that industry. We also construct an indicator benchmark, where we give a value of 1 to all …rms in industries Mining and quarrying, Construction, Manufacturing, and Wholesale, retail, repairs, and 0 to all other …rms. This decision is unchanged when we calculate means by taking all …rms into account. 1 6 Our calculations are based on data from Bankscope and various Central banks.
Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) who …nd that the banking-sector integration in the U.S. following inter-state deregulation increased risk sharing without entailing any signi…cant change in multistate cross-ownership of banks.
Third, we account for errors-in-variables bias induced by the fact that our measure of interbank market integration comes from a …rst-stage regression and is thus measured within a con…dence interval. Errors-in-variables leads to an attenuation bias when the error is linearly related to the true observation (see, for instance, Wooldridge (2002)), implying that at worst we are measuring a lower bound for the e¤ect in the OLS speci…cation. Nevertheless, we still want to make sure that the signi…cance of the results is not a¤ected by the bias in the standard errors of the estimation. For that reason, in Column (6) we use an IV procedure where our measures of interbank market integration have been instrumented for with measures of nominal domestic interbank market yields observed with a 24-month lag. The magnitude of our estimates increases substantially, con…rming that the OLS procedure may yield downward biased results. Importantly, our estimates stay signi…cant at the 5% level.
Finally, we account for the possibility that the rates on business loans are reported with an error. It is entirely conceivable that when responding to the question on the loan's annual cost, the company owners misreport the true cost due to faulty records, rounding, or even bad memory.
The sample exhibits quite a large variation in the …rst digit after the decimal point, pointing to a relative precision in the answers. Still, we prefer to account explicitly for measurement error. Our solution is to replace our measure of the real rate on business loans with a dummy equal to 1 if the real rate is bigger than 500 basis points, and to 0 otherwise. As indicated by the results reported in Column (7), this doesn't change the main results, and neither do di¤erent choices of the cut-o¤ for the dummy.
The e¤ect of banking competition
We now proceed to investigate the hypothesis that real business loan rates in more competitive banking markets show a stronger response to the long-run integration of interbank markets compared to less competitive markets. Table 9 presents the estimates from Equation (10) . We …nd that the e¤ect of interbank market integration is indeed transmitted di¤erently via the channel of banking competition. In competitive credit markets, …rms face signi…cantly lower costs of bank credit as interbank money market integration deepens. However, this e¤ect holds only when we drop from the sample the initial volatile period and focus on the 2001-2005 sub-period (Columns (2)). The estimates decrease marginally when we account for selection (Column (3)). In this case, a doubling of our measure of interbank market integration in countries in the lower half of the banking sector concentration distribution leads to a decrease in real average annualized loan cost of 138 basis points. We …nd a numerically similar e¤ect when instead of the low concentration dummy we interact our measure of integration with a low HHI dummy (Column (4)), however, it is not a signi…cant one.
In all equations, we interact both our measures of interbank market integration and the level of domestic nominal yields on the instruments in question with the dummy for banking sector concentration. While signi…cant on its own, the interaction term which includes the level of nominal money market rates becomes insigni…cant once the interaction of concentration with our measure of integration is included. This implies that the bulk of the e¤ect on real rates is carried by the degree of convergence between domestic and international markets rather than by the nominal yields on assets traded in domestic interbank markets.
We then proceed to check whether our results on the e¤ects of interbank money markets integration, accounting for banking sector concentration, are a¤ected by the choice of proxy for money markets integration. In Columns (5) and (6), we repeat the estimations by replacing the estimate of the degree of integration based on yields on 6-month interbank market instruments with estimates based on 3-and 1-month yields, respectively. Both the statistical signi…cance and the economic effect increase marginally for the shorter maturities. A doubling of the 1-month measure of interbank market integration for example in countries in the lower half of the banking sector concentration distribution leads to a decrease in real average annualized loan cost of "only" 115 basis points.
Firm …nance and leveraging
Finally, we turn our attention to the e¤ect of interbank market integration on the …nancing patterns and the capital structure of the …rm. Our …nding that interbank market integration has reduced the cost of credit leads us to expect that as a result of integration …rms will …nance a higher share of their investment from local commercial banks. Naturally, that should come at the expense of However, we also want to study whether integration hasn't gone "too quickly too far", in the sense of leading to excessive leverage for …rms in very integrated markets. Table 10 presents evidence to that e¤ect. We …nd that …rms which received their last business loan in an environment characterized by deeper interbank market integration …nanced a larger share of their investment in the past 12 months via borrowing from domestic commercial banks (Column (1)), and a lower share of their investment in the past 12 months from retained earnings (Column (2)). We …nd no signi…cant e¤ect on the share of investment …nanced via trade credit (Column (3)). One possible explanation for the latter is that …rms dislike …nancing long-term assets with trade credit because of the maturity mismatch (Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti (2009)). While the …rst two results are only statistically signi…cant at the 10%, both are a logical extension to our previous …ndings.
What these …ndings imply is that integration has enabled …rms to switch away from (potentially) more expensive to cheaper forms of …nancing. However, we now wish to know whether integration hasn't gone too far, tempting …rms with rapidly falling rates on loans to take on excessive bank debt. While there is no clear-cut de…nition of excessive debt, we again turn to our data on German …rms to construct benchmark capital structures. In essence, for each industry we calculate the share of capital investment …nanced with bank loans, and subtract it from the share of capital investment …nanced with bank loans for the …rms in our dataset. While this measure depends on other conditions of the German market, it gives us an approximate measure of "excess leverage".
We then regress this measure on banking integration in Column (4). We also construct an indicator variable equal to 1 for …rms for which excess leverage is strictly positive, and use a probit regression to evaluate how interbank market integration a¤ects the probability of …nancing with bank debt a strictly higher share of capital expenses than a similar German …rm (Column (5)).
We also address the issue that high leverage may be optimal if …rms operate in a high-growth (6)- (7)). Ireland was a similarly high-growth country over the same period, and in fact it had higher average GDP growth than all other countries in the dataset.
The results give some evidence to the "too-quickly-too-far" hypothesis. Namely, we …nd that excess leverage increases with integration, and that the probability of having a positive excess leverage increases with integration as well. In particular, if integration increases by two standard deviations, the probability that a …rm is overleveraged vis-à-vis the leverage of a similar German …rm increases by 11%, and by 14% vis-à-vis a similar Irish …rm. Importantly, the …rm and year …xed e¤ect interactions in the regression make sure that these results are not driven by more shallow equity markets in central and eastern Europe. We read this as evidence that indeed some …rms were tempted into excess bank debt by rapidly falling rates on business loans. This is important evidence that many …rms in central and eastern Europe were overleveraged and over-dependent on bank loans relatively early in the build-up to the 2007-2008 crisis. Rapid interbank market integration led to …rm overleveraging even relative to similar …rms in comparable high-growth countries. Given the severity of the credit crunch in central and eastern Europe, our evidence points to one particular channel via which rapid pre-crisis integration may have contributed to the …rms'woes during the crisis.
Conclusion
Using direct indicators of corporate needs for bank credit, constraints in obtaining it, and rates on actual loans, we investigate the e¤ects of the integration in interbank markets on small …rm …nance. We employ a sample of 6; 000+ …rms from 10 new EU member states and 4 euro zone countries. We construct a measure of the degree of long-run convergence of nominal yields in national interbank markets to yields in the German benchmark interbank market. We pursue an identi…cation strategy by distinguishing across industries'natural dependence on bank …nance. We account for any selection biases by using information on …rms without bank loans. We also account for the structure of the banking sector.
Our …ndings imply that interbank market integration alleviates credit constraints and decreases loan rates. A deepening of integration by two standard deviations would decrease loan rates by 134 basis points, after selection bias is accounted for. These e¤ects only hold in countries with a considerable degree of credit market competition. Hence interbank market integration has a pronounced e¤ect on real loan rates and credit market competition has a strong impact on the size of this e¤ect. Our …ndings have important implications for current events and policy responses in the European …nancial markets which may have decreased the degree of …nancial integration. They also provide food for thought for policy measures a¤ecting banking sector consolidation.
We also …nd some evidence that the rapid convergence of interbank rates, resulting in a rapid decrease in rates on loans to business …rms, may have induced …rms to take on excess leverage.
While the positive e¤ect of integration in making bank loans cheaper and inducing …rms to shift away from more expensive forms of …nance is beyond doubt, our evidence also suggests that …rms in markets which integrated too quickly may have taken on a higher share of bank debt than is This table presents statistics on the share on the cost, collateral and maturity associated with loans to business firms. 'Real loan cost' is calculated as the annualized rate of the loan minus the German interbank market benchmark rate. 'Share of un-collateralized loans' is calculated as the percentage of all loans that didn't require any collateral. 'Loan maturity' is the maturity of the loan in months. for the bank sector data. 'Interbank markets, 1-month rate' is measured by the averaged monthly rate of a 1-month instrument. 'Interbank markets, 3-month rate' is measured by the averaged monthly rate of a 3-month instrument. 'Interbank markets, 6-month rate' is measured by the averaged monthly rate of a 6-month instrument. The country-month values are calculated as in equation (7) (6)). assumes a unit root in the residuals of the cointegration regression, which implies absence of cointegration. The alternative hypothesis assumes a root of less than one. Market rates are interbank rates on 6-month instruments and inter-day differences in rates on 6-month instruments. The country-month values are calculated as in equation (7) and the underlying data comes from the Global Financial Database. Log likelihood -3,593.0 This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit desirability based on firm-and country-level characteristics. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm desires bank credit. 6 β is the estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments from equation (7) . In the case of firms without a loan, it is equal to the within-country average over 1998-2005. '6 month interbank rate' is the nominal rate of 6-month interbank market money instruments. In the case of firms without a loan, it is equal to the within-country average over 1998-2005. 'Small firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. 'Medium firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 50 to 249 employees. 'Individual owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by an individual or a family. 'Government owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by a government agency. 'Foreign owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the owner of the firm is a foreign entity. 'Exporter' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports to non-local markets. 'Privatized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. 'Subsidized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received in the last 3 years subsidies from central or local government. 'Competition' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm faces fairly, very, or extremely strong competition. Ommited category in firm size is 'Large firm'. Source: BEEPS (2004 BEEPS ( , 2005 . Log likelihood -1,656.6 This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit constraint based on firm-and country-level characteristics. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is unconstrained. 6 β is the estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments from equation (7) . In the case of firms without a loan, it is equal to the within-country average over 1998-2005. '6 month interbank rate' is the nominal rate of 6-month interbank market money instruments. In the case of firms without a loan, it is equal to the within-country average over 1998-2005. 'Banking sector C3' is measured as the percentage of banking sector assets held by the 3 largest banks; source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000 Levine ( , updated 2008 . 'Small firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. 'Medium firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 50 to 249 employees. 'Individual owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by an individual or a family. 'Government owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by a government agency. 'Foreign owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the owner of the firm is a foreign entity. 'Exporter' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports to non-local markets. 'Privatized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. 'Subsidized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received in the last 3 years subsidies from central or local government. 'Competition' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm faces fairly, very, or extremely strong competition. Ommited category in firm size is 'Large firm'. Source: BEEPS (2004 and 2005). The dependent variable is the spread of the individual nominal loan rate over the benchmark nominal money market rate. All estimates are from OLS regressions. All regressions apart from the first exclude all Romanian firms. t β is the estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on t-month money instruments from equation (7) . 'Interbank rate' is the nominal rate of a respective t-month interbank market money instruments. Data comes from the Global Financial Database. 'Loan maturity' is the duration of the loan. 'Small firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. 'Medium firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 50 to 249 employees. 'Individual owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by an individual or a family. 'Government owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by a government agency. 'Foreign owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the owner of the firm is a foreign entity. 'Exporter' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports to non-local markets. 'Privatized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. 'Subsidized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received in the last 3 years subsidies from central or local government. Ommited category in firm size is 'Large firm'. 'Mills1' is the selection term from the credit desirability regression (Table V) . 'Mills2' is the selection term from the borrowing constraint regression (Table VI) . (6)) and a dummy equal to 1 if the the spread of the individual loan rate over the benchmark money market is larger than 500 basis points (Column (7)). OLS regression in Columns (1)-(5), IV regression in Column (6), and probit regression in Column (7). In Column (6) the measure of integration is instrumented for using the 24-month lagged value of domestic nominal interbank yields. 6 β is the estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments from equation (7) . 'Credit' equals the industry mean share of capital expenses financed with bank loans by German firms in BEEPS 2004. 'Credit indicator' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in an industry which is in the top 50% of the distribution of industries in Germany based on mean share of capital expences financed with bank loans. 'Capital' equals the industry mean ratio of total material input costs over sales by German firms in BEEPS 2004. 'Capital indicator' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in an industry which is in the top 50% of the distribution of industries in Germany based on mean total material input costs over sales. 'Bank foreign ownership' is the share of bank sector assets held by banks with more than 50% foreign ownership and comes from Bankscope and various central banks. The regressions also include the other variables from Table VII, of the rate on business loans based on firm-and country-level characteristics. The dependent variable is the spread of the individual loan rate over the benchmark money market rate. t β is the estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments in Columns (1)-(4), on 3-month instruments in Column (5), and on 1-month instruments in Column (6), all estimated as in equation (7). 'Bank competition' is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is in the bottom half of the banking sector C3 distribution (Columns (1)- (3) and (5)- (6)); source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000 Levine ( , updated 2008 , and a dummy equal to 1 if the sum of the squared shares of each individual bank's assets out of the total banking sector assets is in the bottom half of the bank HHI distribution (Column (4)); source: Giannetti and Ongena (2009). The regressions also include the other variables from Table VII, including Mills1 and Mills2 (unreported). The regressions exclude all Romanian firms. of the firm's capital structure based on firm-and country-level characteristics. The table presents estimates of the effect of integration on the sources of firm finance. In Column (1) the dependent variable is the share of new investment in the last 12 months financed via borrowing from commercial banks. In Column (2) the dependent variable is the share of new investment in the last 12 months financed with internal funds / retained earnings. In Column (3) the dependent variable is the share of new investment in the last 12 months financed by trade credit from suppliers or customers. In Column (4) the dependent variable is the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks minus the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks by firms in the same industry in Germany. In Column (5) the dependent variable is the probability that the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks minus the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks by firms in the same industry in Germany is bigger than 1. In Column (6) the dependent variable is the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks minus the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks by firms in the same industry in Ireland. In Column (7) the dependent variable is the probability that the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks minus the share of new investment financed via borrowing from banks by firms in the same industry in Ireland is bigger than 1. The regressions also include the other variables from Table VII, including Mills1 and Mills2 (unreported). The regressions exclude all Romanian firms. In columns (6) and (7), the Irish firms are also excluded from the sample. 
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